Introduction
Among many market anomalies uncovered in the last two decades, three stand out as having a long history and receiving the most substantial empirical support. They are market excess volatility, overreaction, and underreaction. Together with other market anomalies, they pose a major challenge to financial economists. To meet these challenges, advocates of behavioral biases have constructed various behavioral models to explain these anomalies. Among the behavioral biases advocated, two stand out as receiving much empirical supports from psychological literatures. These behavioral biases are investors' usage of the conservatism heuristics and the representativeness heuristics in making decisions. The most notable model in this direction is the pioneer work of Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998, henceforth BSV) , in which they show that underreaction in the short-run and overreaction in the long-run are a consequence of the two mentioned heuristics. However, their paper did not show that excess volatility is also a result of the conservatism and representativeness heuristics.
BSV adopt a bounded rationalism approach in which some, but not all, assumptions under the traditional rational expectations asset-pricing theory are violated. Specifically, the "consistent beliefs" made by Sargent (1993) that agents possess correct knowledge of the economic structure are assumed to be violated. In their 1998 paper, BSV assume that while earning announcements follow a random walk, investors using conservative and representative heuristics believe that the earning announcements fall into one of two regimes, a trending regime and a mean reverting regime, and transition from one regime to the other follows a Markov chain. Assuming that the investors still use a correct Bayesian methodology for decision making, BSV then deduce that such a wrong belief will lead to both short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction in the market. This paper takes a different approach from that of BSV in modeling conservatism and representativeness. We assume that the investor knows the correct model but uses a wrong updating methodology. This approach has several advantages as follows: (1) psychological literature clearly states that the two psychological biases arise from investors' attaching wrong weights to information, rather than from their adoption of a wrong model. In this paper, the weighting of information is emphasized and it is a more accurate description of the heuristics used by investors. (2) Since the wrong weights reflect the biases, different degree of biases can be assessed through considering a change in weights. As a result, the seriousness of an anomaly can be quantitatively assessed by investigating into its dependency on weights. (3) New results other than the short-run underreaction and long-run overreaction can be derived and new hypotheses can be formed. We will elaborate on these points below.
According to DeBondt and Thaler (1995) , a good finance theory must be based on psychological evidence of how people actually behave. Psychologists observe that investors pay too much attention to extreme information and less attention to its validity when making judgments and decisions about their investments (Griffin and Tversky, 1992) . When investors are overconfident about their analysis based on the past performance of stocks and underreact to recent information, thus updating their beliefs too slowly in the face of new evidence, they exhibit conservative heuristics (Edwards, 1968; Grether, 1980) . On the other hand, if they are overconfident about the recent information on stocks and pay less attention to the past information on stocks or extrapolate too readily from small samples, thus leading to belief revisions that are too dramatic, they demonstrate representative heuristics Kahneman, 1971, 1974; Kahneman and Tversky, 1973) . Most studies of conservative heuristics involve large samples, whereas most studies on representative heuristics involve smaller samples.
Misunderstanding the impact of sample size on the posterior mean leads investors to make conservative revisions with large samples and radical revisions with small samples. Thus, it is obvious that behavioral biases arise from an inappropriate treatment of information, rather than from a misjudgment on the model. One of the earliest papers addressing conservatism is Edwards (1968) , who reveals that people tend to make behavioral mistakes in their decisions, although they try to employ theoretical models or methodology. He observes that investors with conservative behavior might pay little attention or even ignore the full information from an earnings announcement. They may believe that this information is mainly temporary, and thus they still cling to their prior beliefs based on past earnings. As a result, they might incorporate only partial information from recent earnings announcement in their valuation of shares. In other words, they attach too little a weight to recent information. Edwards (1968) develops a Bayesian model in which individuals tend to underweigh useful statistical evidence relative to the less useful evidence used to form their priors. He observes that it takes two to five observations to do one observation's worth of work in inducing a subject to change his/her opinions. Grether (1980) claims that individuals who exhibit conservatism update their beliefs too slowly in the face of new evidence. Klein (1990) , Mendenhall (1991) , and Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) further suggest that investors tend to underreact to new information. In terms of the Bayesian rule, conservatism means that people tend to overweigh the base rate (prior) and underweigh new information. This is exactly the approach of the proposed model in this paper.
On the representative heuristic, many experiments (see, for example, DeBondt and Thaler 1985; Lakonishok, et al., 1994; Barberis, et al., 1998) show that individuals expect key population parameters to be "represented" in any recent sequence of generated data (see Kahneman, 1971, 1974 for a detailed discussion). Tversky and Kahneman (1971) suggest that local representativeness is a belief in the "law of small numbers," meaning that "the law of large numbers applies to small numbers as well." Investors may find that even small samples (rather than large samples) are highly representative of the populations from which they are drawn. This simply shows that investors may place excessive weights on a sample of small size and neglect distant information unjustifiably. The model proposed in this paper adopts this approach in modeling the law of small sample and in fact, the "smallness" of the sample will be taken into account in our model. We remark that some key measures of market anomalies like market volatility, autocorrelation of market returns, and trading profit of a self-finance long-short strategy can be expressed in terms of the weights and key financial variables like risk free interest rates. The impact of the incorrect weights on the anomalous magnitudes can hence be quantitatively assessed. In doing so, we can compare the impact of conservatism and representativeness on the anomalous magnitudes. We can also study the interaction between the heuristics and the key financial variable. For example, we can show that market's excess volatility is essentially the result of the "law of small number," and under a reasonable assumption on smallness, volatility can become 28 times that of the volatility attributable to pure information, see Section 3 for further details.
Our behavioral model gives rise to a richer body of consequences than BSV. Other than demonstrating short-run underreaction and long-run overreaction, we also derive excess volatility as a consequence of the behavioral model. Furthermore, we can attribute the excess volatility to the representative heuristic and show that excess volatility is more prominent when the discount rate is small. On overreaction and underreaction, we demonstrate that there exists a magnitude effect in the under-and-overreaction phenomena. In other words, if good/bad news announcements repeatedly occur n times, the overreaction/underreaction that results increases with n . Not only we can show that the autocorrelation magnitude and the trading profit increase with n , our model actually shows that these anomalous magnitudes are a convex function of n .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we construct a pseudo-Bayesian framework to model investors' conservative and representative heuristics and develop price dynamics under this model. In Section 3, we study how the heuristics will impact on market volatility in steady state. We then outline in Section 4 the implications of our proposed model by using it to demonstrate the existence of short-run underreaction and long-run overreaction in the stock market. The trading profit resulting from the corresponding momentum/contrarian trading strategies is also derived and analyzed. In Section 5, we show that our model enables us to derive an additional result that there is a "magnitude effect" associated with the under-and overreaction in the stock market. We further show that the magnitude effect is convex in nature. Section 6 wraps up this paper with a conclusion. Some proofs are provided in the appendices.
The Model
In BSV, a representative investor observes the earnings of an asset and updates his/her belief to price the asset. It is assumed that t N , the earnings announcement of the asset at time t , follows a random walk, i.e.,
where t y is an earnings shock at time t . Using a discounting model (see, for example, Wong, 1991,1996; Wong and Chan, 2004; Nishihara and Fukushima, 2008) , the asset is priced at time t as t P given by 
where r is the discount rate or the investor's anticipated return. In (1), t E represents the investor's expectation at time t . In BSV, they first assume that the earnings shock t y is independent and follows a distribution with equal chance on discrete values 0 y or 0 y − . They then assume the representative agent not to realize that the true process for earnings follows a random walk and thus use a wrong model to update his or her beliefs. Finally, they assume that the representative agent uses a correct Bayesian approach to update his or her beliefs. Under these assumptions, BSV deduce that both short-run underreaction and long-run overreaction exist and notice that under-and overreaction occurs as a result of the investor's mis-specification of the model and not from his or her biased updating methods.
In this paper, we propose an alternative approach by assuming that the representative investor is aware of the correct underlying model but fails to adopt a correct approach in the updating process. Brav and Heaton (2002) is the first paper to model an investor as one who misapplies Bayesian methodology. However, they model the representative heuristic only. In this paper, we modify BSV's assumptions as follows: 
A quantitative behavioral model with general weights
We first describe the correct methodology to update information on the mean level µ of the earnings shock. We assume a vague prior for µ , i.e. 0 ( ) P µ 1 ∝ (Matsumura, et al., 1990; Wong and Bian, 2000) . Let i y be the earnings shock observed at the end of period i ,
The posterior distribution of µ is given as follows:
Notice that equal weight is placed on each observation in 1 , , t y y under the Bayesian approach (DeGroot, 1970) . Consistent with the predictions of traditional efficient market, this rational expectations asset-pricing theory assumes that investors can have access both to the correct specification of the "true" economic model and to unbiased estimators of its coefficients (Friedman, 1979) . Obviously, if the rational investor is endowed with an objectively correct prior and the correct likelihood function, he/she will obtain the rational expectations equilibrium and thus any structural irrationally induced financial anomaly should disappear. If investors do not recognize the effect of learning on prices to obtain equilibrium, Blume and Easley (1982) have shown that convergence of beliefs is not guaranteed within a general equilibrium learning model.
Nonetheless, as evidence has mounted against this traditional Bayesian model, theories of financial anomalies have to be developed by relaxing those assumptions. One approach is to assume that investors are plagued with cognitive biases (Slovic, 1972) , and they may incorrectly assign different weights to different observations. To model such behavioral biases, we assume 
1) Under a pseudo-Bayesian approach with a vague prior and an incorrect likelihood ( )
2) The price at time t using the rational expectations pricing model in (1) 
Weight assignment schemes to reflect cognitive biases
In the model above, we incorporate general weights on observations into a simple asset-pricing setup. This allows us to examine the price formation process under a rational expectations approach with biased weights. This approach enables us to quantify investors' cognitive biases and build a quantitative relationship between anomalous asset-price phenomenon and investors' biases. We note that the idea of using different weights on evidences is not new in the finance the available data. Also, it is common in the psychological literature to assume that investors calculate the posterior mean, which is a weighted average rather than a simple average as suggested by a correct Bayesian approach.
In this paper, we use a more general assumption that investors may use weights, 1 2 , , are equal to 1 and the investor has no behavioral bias. In this sense, the third type of investors embraces all other types. Thus, it suffices to consider investors of the third type. To fully understand the price anomalies that will be introduced when incorrect weights are assigned to the likelihood function, we investigate its implication to market volatility in Section 3 and investigate its implications for under-and overreaction in Sections 4 and 5.
Model's Implications for Excess Volatility

Market volatility under the behavioral model
In this section, we study the magnitude of market volatility under our behavioral model in which we define market volatility as the variance of the 1-period return for the asset. Under our behavior model, this volatility is time varying and will reach a steady state when time goes to infinity. To calculate the time-varying volatility with mis-specified weights i ω 's, we recall that the asset price t P measured in a log-scale follows a stochastic process given by (5) 
Hence, its variance can be expressed as ( 
Market volatility at steady state
Notice that when t is small, the investor is still learning about the economic structure. The learning process becomes complete when t gets large. Since we want to distinguish whether the excess volatility is contributed by learning or by behavioral biases, we study the steady state when t tends to infinity. When t s → ∞ as t → ∞ , one can easily show that ( ) 
and the steady-state volatility attributable to behavioral biases is given by 
It is interesting to compare the volatilities arising from these two different sources by computing their ratio. Dividing (10) by (9) 
Expression (11) shows that the ratio depends on the mis-specified weights s ' 
Obviously, from this ratio, the percentage of excess volatility increases as 0 p decreases. Since 0 p represents a bias coming from the "law of small numbers," for this kind of bias, the small sample can be as small as 15 or 30, representing a horizon of 3.75 to 7.5 years of data, considering that the time period from t to t+1 is a quarter of year. Furthermore, if we assume a quarterly discount rate 2% r = , the volatility ratio equals 8.83 when 0 30 p = . This shows that the volatility attributable to cognitive bias can be much larger than the volatility attributable to information uncertainty. In fact, if the "law of small numbers" operates on a even smaller scale, say, 15 0 = p , then the volatility ratio can be as large as 28.8.
In addition, from Proposition 2, one could easily obtain the following three interesting observations about excess volatility:
Excess volatility is a decreasing function of the discount rate or investor's anticipated return r .
Observation 2.
Conservative heuristics will reduce excess volatility.
Observation 3.
Representative heuristics will increase excess volatility.
Model's Implications for Under-and Overreaction
Measures of Under-and Overreaction
Overreaction refers to the predictability of good (bad) future returns from bad (good) past performance, while underreaction refers to the predictability of good (bad) future returns from good (bad) past performance (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985; Lakonishok, et al., 1994) . In the context of a single asset, under-and overreaction could be demonstrated either through return autocorrelations or through the abnormal return under an event approach (BSV). In this paper, both approaches are employed to illustrate the under-and-overreaction phenomena documented by psychologists. Section 4.1.1 adopts a correlation approach while Section 4.1.2 deals with the same concept using an event approach.
Under-and overreaction in terms of correlation coefficients
Consider the k-period return , − to time t . The correlation coefficient between these two returns can be interpreted as the lag-one autocorrelation of the k-period return. Since underreaction is associated with positive autocorrelation and overreaction is associated with negative autocorrelation, we define short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction as follows:
(I). Prices of a single asset exhibit a short-term underreaction (long-term overreaction) in terms of return correlation if the k-period return has a positive (negative) lag-one autocorrelation for sufficiently small (large) k.
We note that the above definition of under-and overreaction is consistent with the mean reversion phenomena reported by Fama and French (1988) 
Under-and overreaction under an event approach
In this section, we consider an alternative way to measure under-and overreaction using the event approach by BSV. The market is said to have underreacted when the average return on the company's stock in a period following an announcement of good news is higher than that in a period following an announcement of bad news. However, when pieces of news come in continuing strings, the opposite phenomenon may occur. In other words, the average return following a series of good news announcements turns out to be lower than that following a series of bad news announcements. This is described as the long-term overreaction phenomenon documented in psychology. 
In (12) 
Under-and overreaction in the presence of behavioral biases
In this section, we assume that the representative investor possesses both conservative and representative heuristics and assigns weights to data as described by (C) in Section 2. We will show in Proposition 3 that asset prices will exhibit underreaction in the short run and overreaction in the long run, where under-and overreaction is measured by return autocorrelations. Proposition 3 is important because it shows that our behavioral model implies that returns are predictable, a well-documented market anomaly in the finance literature. In Proposition 3, predictability results even after the system has reached steady state and hence it does not arise only from the investors' learning process. We then demonstrate short-term underreaction and long-term overreaction phenomena using an event approach in Proposition 4. 
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Furthermore, the correlation coefficients above is non-trivial for sufficiently large t , i.e. the limiting correlation coefficients for t → ∞ is non-zero.
This proposition reveals the short-term underreaction phenomenon that the correlation of stock returns are positively correlated (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985) and long-term overrreaction phenomenon that the correlation of stock returns are negative correlated (Fama and French, 1996) by the conservative and representative heuristics.
As explained in Section 4.1.2, under-and overreaction can also be treated using an event approach in which under-and overreaction is measured by the expected momentum profit ) , ( j s U t defined in (12). We will show in Proposition 4 below that, for a representative investor
is positive when j is small and is negative when j is large.
In other words, momentum trading is profitable on a short run of good or bad news but contrarian trading is profitable on a long-run of good or bad news. 
is non-trivial when t tends to infinity, i.e., the limiting trading profit is non-zero for t → ∞ .
The proof of Proposition 4 is in the appendix. From the proof of Proposition 4, we can see that the representative heuristic contributes to the contrarian profit, while the conservative heuristic contributes to the momentum profit, and Proposition 4 links investors' irrational cognitive biases to financial anomalies of overreaction and underreaction. It shows that overreaction occurs after long-run periods of good or bad performance, whereas underreaction happens after short-run periods of good or bad performance. In addition to demonstrating the existence of overreaction in the long run, Proposition 4 also provides good insights into how the contrarian/momentum profits arise. The representative heuristic has to overpower the conservative heuristic for a contrarian profit to surface. The long-run assumption is necessary for a contrarian profit because under a long-run situation the representativeness bias will become noticeable.
Another interesting observation is that both momentum/contrarian profits are sensitive to the discount rate r . The smaller the discount rate, the larger the momentum/contrarian profits. This is because when r is small, future cash flows become important, and a mis-estimation of future cash flows will intensify the over-or underreaction phenomena.
Model's Implications for the Magnitude Effect
Existence of a magnitude effect
In this section, we will provide theoretical support for the magnitude effect of the under-andoverreaction hypotheses. In an early paper on the overreaction hypothesis, DeBondt and Thaler (1985) write "Specifically, two hypotheses are suggested: (1) extreme movements in stock prices will be followed by subsequent price movements in the opposite direction. (2) The more extreme the initial price movement, the greater will be the subsequent adjustment." While (1) is usually referred to as the overreaction hypothesis, and (2) states that overreaction does have a magnitude effect. In this paper, we show that not only can our quantitative behavioral model provide theoretical support to (1) but it can also be used to demonstrate that the resulting under-and overreaction does entail a magnitude effect as specified in (2). Recall that the definition of ) , ( j s U t in (12) stands for the expected profit of the momentum trading strategy. Observe that both parameters s and j represent an "event magnitude." For the parameter s , the larger is s , the more extreme is the earnings shock, and the more extreme is the event under study. On the other hand, the parameter j represents another dimension of "event magnitude." If j is large, the event consists of a bigger clustering of good or bad news and the event becomes more extreme as j gets larger. Thus, the "magnitude effect" associated with the under-or overreaction may have two meanings:
(1) the momentum (contrarian) profit ( ) 
Proposition 6 (a magnitude effect in j).
(1) When j is sufficiently large, the contrarian profit based on j consecutive good or bad news increases as j increases.
(2) When j is sufficiently small, the momentum profit based on j consecutive good or bad news increases as j decreases.
The proof of Proposition 5 is in the appendix. The proof of Propositions 6 is similar to that of Proposition 5 and is skipped in this paper. We note that the conditions in Propositions 5 are equivalently to the conditions in which both the momentum and contrarian strategies of trading on string of good or bad news will have a profit that will increase with the magnitude of the impact of the news.
Convexity in the magnitude effect
In Section 5.1, we demonstrate that there is a magnitude effect in the under-and-overreaction phenomena, in the sense that momentum/contrarian trading profit increases with the magnitude of the earnings shock. In this section, we go one step further to show in Proposition 7 that when s is used as a magnitude measure, the magnitude effect is convex in nature. For example, when magnitude doubles, the momentum/contrarian trading profit is more than doubled. The proof of Proposition 7 is in the Appendix.
Concluding Remarks
We obtain another resolution to explain the under-and-overreaction phenomena. Further research could include incorporating our approach and their approach to find a better explanation of the under-and-overreaction phenomena. In addition, we note that our approach could be benefited from the fuzzy logic theory in the development of the heuristic model. One could call our approach to be intelligent model by using fuzzy logic approach to focus on behavioral biases incorporated in it. 4 Further research could also incorporate fuzzy logic approach to our approach.
In addition, we note that Lam et al. (2008) have developed new test statistics to test the magnitudes of the under-and-overreaction phenomena in the international markets and confirm that there exist the magnitudes effects in the under-and-overreaction phenomena. 
Proof of Proposition 4:
Before we prove Proposition 4, we state Lemma 1 as follows: This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Let ϕ and Φ are the pdf and cdf of Z , a standard normal random variable with mean zero and unit standard deviation, respectively. Before we prove proposition 5, we first prove the Property 
